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An Iterative On–Line Mechanism for
Demand–Side Aggregation
Achie C. Chapman and Gregor Verbicˇ
Abstract—This paper considers a demand–side aggregation
scheme specifically for large numbers of small loads, such
as households and small and medium–sized businesses. We
introduce a novel auction format, called a staggered clock–proxy
auction (SCPA), for on–line scheduling of these loads. This is
a two phase format, consisting of: a sequence of overlapping
iterative ascending price clock auctions, one for each time–slot
over a finite decision horizon, and; a set of proxy auctions that
begin at the termination of each individual clock auction, and
which determine the final price and allocation for each time–slot.
The overlapping design of the clock phases grant bidders the
ability to effectively bid on inter–temporal bundles of electricity
use, thereby focusing on the most–relevant parts of the price–
quantity space. Since electricity is a divisible good, the proxy
auction uses demand–schedule bids, which the aggregator uses to
compute a uniform–price partial competitive equilibrium for each
time slot. We show that, under mild assumptions on the bidders’
utilities functions, the proxy phase implements the Vickrey–
Clarke–Groves outcome, which makes straightforward bidding
in the proxy phase a Bayes–Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we
demonstrate the SCPA in a scenario comprised of household
agents with three different utility function types, and show how
the mechanism enables efficient on–line energy use scheduling.
I. INTRODUCTION
DEMAND response refers to methods for influencing theamount of power drawn from an electrical power system
by end–users, thereby making electrical loads a resource that
can be used to undertake control actions, such as load–
balancing, peak load shaving, emergency load shedding and
ancillary services. Demand response is employed to provide
additional capacity to the power system without costly new
infrastructure, and to facilitate greater penetration of renew-
able generation, as increasingly flexible energy use is able
to better track the intermittent supply provided by many
renewable sources of energy. In this paper, we develop a
small–load demand–response aggregation (SL–DR) scheme;
that is, a scheme constructed specifically for aggregating the
large numbers of small loads, such as households and small–
and medium–sized enterprises, spread across an electrical
distribution network.
We adopt a typical framework comprising an SL–DR ag-
gregator that coordinates, schedules or otherwise controls
part of participating electrical loads. The aggregator may
be a retailer trying to keep energy purchasing costs down
by encouraging electricity use at cheaper times, or a third
party trading price differences on a wholesale electricity
market. We assume that the aggregator operates in either a
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highly competitive environment, or that its prices/margins are
regulated, so that it is only able to extract a small charge
per kWh from its customers. In effect, this is the same as
assuming that the aggregator is benevolent, and only passes on
its cost of purchasing energy in the wholesale market. On the
customer side, we assume that each user has (at least partial)
automation of a proportion of its interruptable and deferable
loads by employing an energy management system (EMS),
which controls or schedules devices include a hot water storage
system, home ventilation and air conditioning, dish washers,
clothes washers and dryers, and so on. Indeed, the scheme
developed here might only be applied to selected devices,
which are put under the EMS’s control, and for which the
customer has no want or need to draw power from the grid at
a specific time.
In particular, this paper investigates an auction–based ag-
gregation scheme for scheduling energy use in a future power
system. In doing so, we directly confront three major difficul-
ties inherent in aggregating residential loads. First, we note
that most small users, such as households, have a demand
for electrical energy this is inherently combinatorial and non–
convex in structure. Specifically, many small user’s electrical
loads possesses both inter–temporal complementarity and sub-
stitute effects. Substitute effects primarily involve shifting the
timing that a device draws a load from the grid (e.g. actively
controlling the recharge schedule of a hot water storage
system or the start time of a dishwasher). An example of a
complementarity is a residential electricity user that has a need
to both wash and dry their clothes; however, washing must be
done before drying can start. In addition to complementarities,
other non–convexities arise when users’ devices have discrete
operating points, such as heating and cooling devices that
use compressors, or washing and cleaning devices with set
programs. Second, users’ preferences over energy use patterns
are private, and are unknown to the aggregator (or any other
user). As such, any SL–DR scheme needs to consider the
difficulties of implementing an efficient allocation when users
can misreport their preferences. Third, considering the large
number of participants required to make an SL–DR scheme
financially viable, any system comprising an aggregator and
its users will face significant communication and computation
requirements.
To this end, we introduce a novel combinatorial clock–
proxy auction format [1] tailored to the on–line electricity
use scheduling problem. Existing clock–proxy auction formats
only consider static problems, such as radio spectrum alloca-
tion, and so are not directly applicable to the dynamic, on–
line environment of SL–DR. Thus, the main contribution of
2this paper is to adapt the techniques of clock–proxy auctions
to the problem of on–line scheduling of a resource with users
that have preferences defined over combinations of different
times of resource use.
In more detail, we propose a staggered clock–proxy auction
(SCPA), an iterative auction format consisting of a sequence of
overlapping clock auctions, one for each time–slot in a day,
extending out to a suitable finite decision horizon (i.e. one
day), with the final allocation and prices in an individual time–
slot determined by a proxy auction. In a practical implemen-
tation, the SCPA’s auction slots are expected to align with the
local energy market’s operation. For example, in the Australian
National Electricity Market, supply procurement auctions are
run for each 30 minute period; the SCPA is constructed in such
a way that iteration can be completed within this duration.
Moreover, the SCPA’s operation is both: (i) oblivious to the
preference models held by the users or their EMS agents,
and as such, it is not tied to any one particular preference
representation or utility model, and (ii) any monotonic cost
function can be employed by the aggregator, including those
generated by the piece–wise linear supply functions used in
many wholesale electricity markets. This makes the SCPA
flexible and generally applicable, which stands in contrast
to many proposed aggregation mechanisms that are tied to
specific utility and/or cost models (see Section II for a detailed
comparison).
SCPAs retain three important features of combinatorial
clock–proxy auctions for static settings: (i) anonymous (uni-
form) linear prices; (ii) monotonic price changes; and (iii)
activity rules for quantity changes. By preserving these fea-
tures, SCPAs directly addresses the three difficulties facing
aggregators of residential loads listed above. First, bidders can
in effect bid on inter-temporal bundles of electricity use, by
adjusting their bids across all time–slots according to all prices
for all time–slots, thereby matching their potentially complex
preferences for electricity use. Second, incentives for partici-
pants to “game” the aggregation scheme, by interacting strate-
gically rather than sincerely, are reduced through the SCPA’s
use of well-designed price– and bid–adjustment rules in the
clock phase, and by implementing competitive equilibrium
prices in the proxy phase. Third, the iterative nature of SCPAs
reduces the communication and computation requirements of
the aggregator and bidders, by focusing participants’ bids on
the most relevant parts of the price-quantity space in the clock
phase, and using this to restrict the price interval over which
demand levels are specified in the proxy phase. This compares
favourably to direct auction mechanisms, which typically rely
on solving centralised winner-determination and cost division
problems.
Furthermore, our SCPA rolling horizon format is appropri-
ate in the SL–DR problem, given the recurring nature of many
households’ tasks and energy use requirements (e.g. space
heating and cooling, hot water storage, cleaning, and so on), as
these tasks do not require planning over a horizon of longer
than a day. In addition to the above, we expect that users
know only some broad energy requirements at long horizons,
and that more detailed schedules are available only as the
time of use draws near. Thus, an on–line mechanism with
Retailer/
RDR aggregator
Observed energy flows
Other information flows
Fig. 1. Aggregator and users interaction: control of appliances remains
completely under a user’s control, via the Home ECU; the aggregator observes
energy flows via the metering infrastructure (solid lines); other information
flows are facilitated via a communications infrastructure (dashed lines).
an overlapping initial phase and staggered closing phase is
appropriate for this setting.
Finally, it should be noted that by using a dynamic pricing
mechanism such as the SCPA, an aggregator is able to pass
some price volatility risk on to the end user. This sharing of
risk is complemented by our assumption that users have some
automated devices that can respond to dynamic pricing. A user
may also limit its exposure to varying prices by only including
some devices in the scheme, e.g. to only include hot water
recharging and the start time of the dishwasher overnight. In
this way, the customer can choose their level of exposure to
the risk inherent in time–varying prices. That said, one of the
key benefits of deploying schemes such as the SCPA at a large
scale is that they are expected to reduce price variability, as
flexible loads are shifted to time–slots with lower prices and
away from those with higher prices.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
1) We develop an iterative on–line auction protocol, SC-
PAs, appropriate for small-load electricity-use schedul-
ing;
2) We include costly supply into the analysis of clock–
proxy auctions (c.f. standard clock–proxy auctions
where the seller is assumed to have no value for the
goods);
3) For this more general setting, we prove that straightfor-
ward bidding is an equilibrium of an individual proxy
phase of SCPAs; and
4) We demonstrate a specific implementation of a SCPA
for an energy use scheduling problem comprising house-
holds with three different utility representations, which
shows that the method is feasible for most standard
duration time–slots for a large number of users, and that
the SCPA can help reduce price variability in wholesale
markets, thereby reducing total system energy costs.
The paper progresses as follows: The next section reviews
the literature on demand response, with focus on applications
of online mechanism design. Section III introduces the model
and describes the energy use scheduling problem addressed. In
Section IV, we define the general SCPA format, including two
different bid–adjustment rules, and in Section V, we analyse
the general properties of SCPAs, prove some important equi-
librium results for the proxy phase, and discuss the sequence
of prices and allocations that the SCPA produces. Section VI
describes and evaluates a specific implementation of a SCPA
for an energy use scheduling problem. Finally, Section VII
summarises and lists future directions.
3II. RELATED WORK
This section contains a brief review of related approaches to
online SL–DR problems. A general survey of non-cooperative
games applied to demand–response is presented in [2], and a
detailed critique can be found in [3].
Several recent works adopt a mechanism design approach
to energy use scheduling. Both [4] and [5] propose Vickrey–
Clarke–Groves (VCG) based mechanisms, in line with those
derived in [6], [7]; and another, related approach is derived
in [8]. However, VCG is a direct mechanism, so to use it,
the aggregator can take one of two approaches. First, the
aggregator could ask for valuations to be reported over a
complete set of demand bundles, but in this case the size of
the required preference representations grows exponentially as
the model becomes more fine-grained (i.e. considers shorter
and more time–slots). Second, the aggregator could enforce
a compact preference representation. For example, [4] use a
simplified preference model in the form of a convex function
taking a small number of parameters, while [5] achieve the
same by considering only one device, a plug–in electric vehi-
cle. Nonetheless, the underlying optimisation problem used to
compute VCG allocations and payments grows exponentially
in the number of participants and with the size of their
messages. Both of these effects have severe detrimental effects
on the feasibility of communication to and computation by the
aggregator. Thus, we consider an iterative auction design.
Several iterative mechanisms are related to our work. The
authors of [9] consider an iterative combinatorial auction for
a collection of divisible goods. Their technique implements
an efficient allocation by individually querying bidders about
their types and ensuring sincere responses by implementing
transfers that are the same as those for VCG in expectation.
The techniques used in that paper cannot be directly applied to
our setting with divisible goods and a large number of bidders,
but both make use of iterative ascending prices to implement
Pareto efficient allocations. An ascending-price method similar
to the SCPAs clock phase is proposed in [10] for energy
consumption scheduling. The proposed method is proven to
converge, but is not analysed with respect to the strategic
opportunities available to energy users.
Finally, several auction formats currently in use are closely
related to the SCPA. The SCPAs proxy phase is reminiscent
of the reverse supply function auctions used in wholesale
electricity markets for procuring generation capacity [11], and
also auctions of US Treasury Securities [12]. Electricite´ de
France (EDF) until recently used a clock auction format in
their generation capacity auctions [13]. Various authorities
around the world have used combinatorial clock–proxy auc-
tions to sell radio-frequency spectrum, e.g. the Australian
Communications and Media Authority’s 700 MHz and 2.5
GHz spectrum auctions [14].
III. MODEL AND PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
Throughout, the set of real numbers is denoted R, and 1 is an
all-ones vector of length given by context. We adopt a discrete-
time model, where operations are divided into H = {t, t +
1, . . . , t +H−1}, consisting of H time–slots over the decision
horizon. Consequently, all electrical quantities are stated as
blocks of energy; for example a 100W appliance running for
30 minutes is described by a 0.05kWh demand block.
The on—line energy–use scheduling model consists of:
• A divisible good, electricity, with supply level in time–
slot h of xh ∈ R+;
• A set of agents I = {0,1,2, . . . , I}, where 0 is the
aggregator, with:
– A set of cost functions ch : R+ → R+, one for each
time slot to capture varying costs of generation,
where ch(xh) is the cost to the aggregator of sup-
plying xh units of electrical energy in time–slot h, (it
has no further intrinsic value to the aggregator);
and each i 6= 0 is an electricity user agent, with:
– A level of demand for electrical energy, dih ∈ R+
during time–slot h ∈H , such that xh = ∑i∈I \0 dih;
– A preference function over levels of electricity use
in each time–slot, vi : RH+ → R+, where vi(di,θi) is
the value to i for a demand profile over time of di =
[dit ,dit+1, . . . ,dit+H−1]⊤ when its private state (type) is
given by an information structure θi.
In this setting, the information structure θi ∈ Θ represents
the state of a set of tasks or activities that the user em-
ploys electrical energy to complete. As such, users’ prefer-
ence functions should accommodate both complementary and
substitution effects in power use across the different time
slots. These effects are the result of electricity’s use as an
intermediate good: electricity is not consumed per se, but
put to use to perform tasks such as heating and cooling,
cooking, cleaning, lighting and entertainment. The patterns of
demand for completion of these tasks — which may have
inter–temporal complementarities, order relations, or might
be substituted between different times — is then manifest in
complicated preferences for electricity use.
Given this general model, the SL–DR problem is to derive
the method by which an aggregator optimally structures its
interaction with users. That is, an SL–DR scheme defines
how the aggregator divides the costs it faces among its users,
and induces them to use electricity at the most appropriate
times. Let d = [d1, . . . ,dI ] be the concatenation of electricity
use vectors over the horizon; the profile of demands for time–
slot h is its hth row, denoted dh. In general, we can define
the cost division used by the aggregator as a vector function,
φ(ch(xh),dh), which returns a vector of costs, one for each
user. In this, the aggregator calculates xh = dh ·1.
Given the users’ preferences and costs above, we can define
a utility function uih(d), which takes a quasi–linear form
(linear in prices), to combine their values and costs for using
electricity:
ui(d) = vi(di,θi)−
t+H−1
∑
h=t
φi(ch(xh),dh), (1)
where φi(ch(xh),dh) is the ith component of the aggregator’s
cost division function. Equation (1) shows that the aggregator
and users’ actions are coupled through their dependence of
their utilities on the vector of total loads over H , x =
[xt , . . . ,xt+H−1]. Thus, their interaction results in a game; and
4since each user’s state, θi, and therefore its reward function,
vi, is private, it is a game of incomplete information.
A standard solution to these games is given by the Bayes-
Nash equilibrium condition.
Definition 1: A Bayes-Nash equilibrium is a set of demands
di for the N competitive bidders such that for each bidder i ,
di maximises its expected utility of profit for all θ−i ∈ Θ−i.
The desirable properties that an auction may exhibit include
allocative efficiency, social welfare maximisation, incentive
compatibility and budget balancedness. An allocation is effi-
cient if the goods go to the bidders with the highest valuations.
This corresponds to the notion of social welfare maximisation,
where an allocation is efficient if it maximises the sum of all
agents’ utilities; in our setting this is given by:
∑
i∈I
ui(d∗)≥ ∑
i∈I
ui(d) ∀ d
A auction mechanism is called incentive compatible if all
agents do their best by truthfully reporting their private
information to the auctioneer. A mechanism can either be
either dominant strategy incentive compatible, in which case
the best action of any bidder is to truthfully report regard-
less of what others do; or it can be Bayes-Nash incentive
compatible, in which case truth–telling forms a Bayes-Nash
equilibrium, as defined above. Finally, a mechanism is called
(ex-post) balanced if it does not require money to be injected
or withdrawn to balance the payments between participants
(cf. some mechanisms implement efficient outcomes but at a
risk of running a deficit).
IV. THE SCPA AUCTION FORMAT
In this section, we describe the generic SCPA format, while
Section V provides analysis of the mechanism.
The SCPA is an iterative simultaneous auction, consisting
of H live slot auctions, one for each time slot h ∈ H . The
cost division function is defined for each slot independently,
and is linear and anonymous, so that each slot has one price
ph and costs are proportional to use, and as such, prices do
not depend on the identity of the buyer; that is, ∀h ∈H :
φh(ch(xh),d) = ph ·dh.
This stands in contrast to the often-used VCG mechanism,
which uses both nonlinear and discriminatory pricing.
For each time–slot, the SCPA consists of two phases: (i) an
ascending-price clock phase, which runs in parallel with the
clock phases of other time–slots in H , and (ii) an individual
proxy phase, with the closing times of these phases staggered
in order of their time–slot. All H clock phases are run together,
but are paused when the next-closing time–slot t’s proxy
auction is run. Thus, the procedure alternates between a clock
auction phase, during which bids are placed on all h ∈ H ,
and a proxy auction phase, during which bids are placed for
allocations in the next-closing time–slot, t, while the other
time–slots’ prices are held fixed. The final allocation and unit
price for time–slot t is determined in the proxy phase, after
which the entire procedure moves forward one time–slot, and a
new clock auction for time–slot t+H is opened. In total, each
time–slot is involved in H clock phases before its final proxy
Apply restart discount
Reset activity rules
Open t+H clock auction 
Proxy 
auction 
closed
Clock
phases 
restart
Fig. 2. Schematic of the SCPA, showing separate clock and proxy phases.
phase, punctuated by H − 1 proxy phases for the preceding
live time–slots. All bids placed during the clock phases are
considered live in the subsequent proxy auction phase. Bids in
the clock phases are also subject to bidding and activity rules,
some of which are carried over into the proxy phase, thereby
binding bidders’ proxy-phase bids to their bids in earlier clock
phases.
The general SCPA procedure is outlined in Fig. 2. The next
two sections provide the details of the clock and proxy phases.
A. Clock Phase
Within each time–slot h, there is a sequence of k ≥ 1 clock
auction iterations. Each iteration consists of a price adjustment
step and a bid update step, as indicated by the while loop
in the left box in Fig. 2. In this process: (i) the aggregator
updates prices in response to bids, depending on a measure of
revenue deficit (RD), then (ii) the buyers update their bids in
response to the new prices, according to their own preferences,
while (iii) iterations stop when the process meets a termination
condition that also depends on the level of excess demand.
Details of these three steps are given in the sections below,
but before beginning, we introduce some notation: at iteration
k for all active time–slot auctions h ∈H , let pk be the H×1
vector of prices. For each agent, i ∈ I , let idk be the H× 1
vector of its bids.
1) Price Adjustment: In each time–slot auction, price ad-
justment is monotonic, with prices beginning low and rising
until the revenue deficit in that time–slot is (close to) elim-
inated. For each slot h ∈ H , let the per-unit revenue deficit
when xkh units of energy are supplied be given by:
RDkh = c(x
k
h)/x
k
h− p
k
h. (2)
In this expression, the term c(xkh)/xkh is average total cost
(ATC), and it plays an important role in the proxy phase.
In the first clock auction for time–slot t + H, prices are
initialised a point p0h that is certain to be less the aggregator’s
average total cost. This can be p0h = 0, which is reasonable
because total energy demand is bounded, but higher will result
in fewer clock–phase iterations. In subsequent restarts, the
price of electricity in a time–slot begins close to its closing
price in the previous clock phase. In practice, a small discount
is applied to the closing prices to accommodate changes in
5preferences flowing from unforseen random events, i.e. to
allow for uncertainties in energy use and generation costs.
Within a single clock auction phase, let xkh be the total
demand in time–slot h at iteration k, and pkh be the price
inducing that level of demand. If RD > 0, such that the price
of supplying xkh units of energy is not covered by the auction’s
revenue, then the price increases. Otherwise, the price stays
the same in the next iteration k+1; that is, the price for each
slot is adjusted by:
pk+1h =
{
pkh + δk+1 if RDkh > 0,
pkh otherwise.
(3)
where δk+1 is a configurable price adjustment step-size.
2) Bid Updates: As in standard combinatorial clock auc-
tions, bid quantity adjustments are constrained by bidding and
activity rules, which demarcate the space of admissible bid
changes in response to price adjustments. The activity rule we
consider is based on the microeconomic principle of revealed
preferences, as introduced for clock–proxy auctions in [1].
Definition 2: Revealed-preference (RP) bid constraint. For
all iterations k, l ≥ 1, k < l, an agent’s bid across the decision
horizon must satisfy:
(pk)⊤ ·i dk− (pk)⊤ ·i dl ≥ 0, (4)
and:
(pl)⊤ ·i dl − (pl)⊤ ·i dk ≥ 0. (5)
The two constraints above imply that bundle idk is preferred to
idl under prices pk, because the agent is willing to pay more in
total for idk, and vice versa for prices pl . We require that these
two constraints are satisfied for every bid in every iteration of
the clock phase, but that they are reset when the clock auction
is restarted after a proxy phase closes one auction.
This rule deters the users from gaming the system. For
example, a group of users may try to systematically over–
bid for energy in some slots in order to drive other users
away, then reduce demand in the clock–phase after those
others have purchased more energy in earlier time–slots (this
is often called bid parking). The opportunities to profit from
this and other styles of gaming are mitigated by the RP bid
constraints, but we emphasise that to be effective, the RP bid
constraints must be also applied to bids placed in the proxy
phase; indeed, Equation (4) and Equation (5) are the link
between the clock and proxy phases. If they are not carried
over, then the bidders are not bound to the prices discovered
in the clock phase. In contrast, under the price adjustment
and restart rules described above, the effects of the RP bid
constraints are carried across phases of the SCPA.
3) Termination Condition: In each clock auction, prices
stop ascending if RDh ≤ 0. Note that demand for energy in h
can rise when prices in other time–slots from which energy can
be substituted increase, so that RDh again becomes > 0, and
the price recommences ascending. However, the entire clock
phase terminates when RDh < 0 for all H .
B. Proxy Phase
The proxy phase operates only for time–slot t, the next–
closing time–slot’s allocation. During the proxy phase for t,
all other time–slots’ prices are fixed at their last clock phase
levels pH \t . In the proxy phase, users bid their demand levels
for electricity over a restricted interval of prices, which the
aggregator uses to compute a final price, as illustrated in Fig. 2
and detailed below.
1) Price Interval and Breakpoints: The first step in the
proxy phase is for the aggregator to determine a price interval
and breakpoints, which are chosen to ensure that the user
demand schedule generated from the users’ bids intersects with
the supply function. Denote interval ends and breakpoints by
P = [P0,P1, . . . ,P|P|]. We do not prescribe a procedure, but it
suffices to say that relatively simple techniques can be used to
ensure supply crosses demand. These might include analysing
bids in the preceding clock phases, or the history of closing
prices in previous proxy phase for this time–slot during the
day, and estimating the slope of the aggregate demand curve
around the clearing prices or placing a confidence interval
around a predicted clearing price. Breakpoints can then be
spread uniformly between the interval ends, or their spacings
can be scaled according to some distributional information
about where the MCE price will fall.
2) Demand Schedules: Bidders pass a vector of demand
levels to the aggregator:
Di(P) = [di(P0),di(P1), . . . ,di(P|P|)],
corresponding to the breakpoints P. These marginal bid levels
are subject to the RP bid constraints. Additionally, the bidders’
demands must satisfy: di(Pl) ≥ di(Pm) for all Pl < Pm, so
that each bidder’s demand curve is weakly downward-sloping.
This reflects the typical microeconomic assumption that con-
sumption of each unit more of a good has decreasing benefit.
In contrast to the clock phase, in time–slot t’s proxy phase,
the other time–slot prices are fixed, so this assumption can
be applied without having to consider flow-on effects from
simultaneously increased prices in other time–slots.
The aggregator computes the aggregate demand schedule D
from the demand levels {Di(P)}i∈I \0 by first calculating:
D =
[
∑
i∈I \0
di(Pk)
]|P|
k=0
and then taking the linear interpolation of values in D as the
aggregate demand curve.
3) Computing the Final Price and Allocation: The intersec-
tion of the aggregate demand schedule and the supply function
determines the final price for energy in a time–slot, which the
bidders use to choose their level of demand.
Specifically, given D, the aggregator solves for the intersec-
tion of ATC with the line segments between the breakpoints,
which can be done numerically. This approach may appear
unsatisfying in the cases of small numbers of users, but for
large numbers, we are confident that computing prices in this
way will produce a valid solution, by appeal to the Shapley-
Folkman theorem [15]. This is because the relative effects of
discrete changes in electricity use (e.g. turning a device on or
6off) are much larger for fewer users than for larger numbers
of users. In other words, the aggregate demand schedule
approches a continuous curve as the number of users grows.
V. ANALYSIS OF SCPA
We now analyse the operation of SCPAs and discuss how
they bring about an efficient allocation in on–line electricity
use scheduling problems. This analysis starts with the proxy
phase and works backwards to the clock phase, as would be
done to analyse a finite–horizon dynamic program.
We begin by noting that the purpose of the clock phase
of the SCPA is to aid price-discovery and facilitate energy
use coordination between the users, not to fix an allocation
or determine final prices. The proxy phase is then used to
find an efficient allocation at “good” prices for the next time–
slot. Thus it is the proxy phase that receives the most detailed
analysis, and for which we provide the strongest results.
A. Analysis of Individual Proxy Auctions
In order to analyse the proxy phase, we now introduce some
concepts from cooperative game theory. In this section, the
time–slot index h is dropped, because only one proxy auction
is run at a time, and the private information structure θi is
omitted because the agents implicitly report this information
to the aggregator in the form of their proxy bids.
A (static) transferable utility (TU) game is a pair 〈I ,w〉,
where I is a set of players, and w(S) is a characteristic
function, w : 2I → R+ with w( /0) = 0, that maps from each
possible coalition S to the worth of S.
Call the proxy phase of the SCPA a demand–schedule
bid (DSB) game. The function w(S) defines the worth of
S ⊆ I as the sum of all participants’ values, which is the
value of the electrical energy provided by the aggregator, less
the aggregator’s costs (as long as the aggregator is included,
otherwise no electricity is traded); that is:
w(S) =


max
d ∑i∈S\0 v
i(di)− c
(
∑
i∈S\0
di
)
if 0 ∈ S
0 otherwise.
(6)
In general, a payoff in a TU game is a vector of utilities,
[ui]i∈I ∈ R
I
. We continue to assume that the users utilities
are quasi-linear, as in Equation (1). Given this, changes to the
cost division function φ alters the payoff profile by transferring
utility among the market participants, but it does not alter
the coalition’s worth, as this is only given by the values and
costs of using and supplying electricity within the aggregation
scheme.
The stable outcomes of the proxy auction are characterised
using the concept of the core of cooperative game.
Definition 3: The core of a TU game 〈I ,w〉 is the set
of payoffs satisfying two conditions: (i) the payoffs must
share the full worth of I among its members, and (ii) the
payoffs must provide no opportunity for a profitable deviation
to any subset of players S⊂I . Formally, these conditions are
expressed as:
Core(I ,w) =
{
[ui]i∈I : ∑
i∈I
ui = w(I ), ∑
i∈S
ui ≥ w(S) ∀S ⊆I
}
Note that payoffs in the core are efficient, by the definition
of a coalition’s worth function in Equation (6), and also that
no money is in injected into or removed from the coalition
(i.e. the transfers are balanced).
It has long been known that in all TU exchange economy
games (a.k.a. Edgeworth boxes) with convex increasing utility
functions and fixed endowments of goods, the core has positive
measure [16]. However, a DSB game with costly production
(i.e. by the aggregator) needs to satisfy an additional condition:
that the slope of the aggregator’s cost function is less than the
slope of the sum (or aggregate) of the bidders’ utility functions
at zero allocation, or in microeconomic terminology, that the
market supply function is less than the demand function at
zero demand. This ensures that average total cost and demand
intersect at a positive price and level of supply. Assuming
demand is weakly downward sloping, then this is readily
satisfied in our setting, so the DSB game has a core.
In order to give some intuition for the proxy auction,
Figure 3 illustrates the market generated by the proxy phase.
In it, the curve D represents aggregate demand for each price
level. Note that aggregate demand across all slots depends
on the prices in all time–slots, because the users values are
assumed to have inter-temporal couplings. Therefore, the D
shown is actually a function of ph only, with all other p−h
held constant. Figure 3 also shows the aggregator’s marginal
revenue, supply (marginal cost) and average total cost (ATC)
curves, and various equilibria are marked (A, B, C).
In Figure 3, the Pareto efficient outcomes (in which no
player can be made better off without making at least one
other worse off) of the market fall along the demand curve
between the points A and C. The seller’s profit is maximised
at A, which is the rational monopolist’s level of production
(i.e. a single producer facing an aggregate demand function
composed of infinitesimally small buyers), and corresponds to
a production level x that equates the seller’s marginal revenue
and its marginal cost. Neither seller nor any of the buyers
benefits from increasing the price above this level or reducing
the level of production further.
Moving down the curve, the point B is the perfect com-
petitive equilibrium, which is used in the case of a supply
function given aggregated from the supply of a very large
number producers, all with infinitesimally small market power,
facing a similarly large number of buyers.
Finally, the point C is the minimum competitive equilibrium
(MCE), which corresponds to a price that equates the sellers’
average total cost to the buyers’ aggregate demand function,
so that all of the surplus from trade is captured by the buyers.
In our setting, with only one seller, the MCE is the Pareto
efficient outcome that minimises the aggregator’s utility:
max
d
ui(di, p) = max
d
[
vi(di)− p⊤ ·di,0
]
∀i ∈I \ 0
(7)
s.t. u0(x, p) = p⊤ · x− c(x) = 0 (8)
where in the second expression x = 1 ·d, which implies that
the aggregator receives payments equal to its costs. Any point
on D below C has the aggregator trading at a loss, in which
case it is better to not prticipate in the market at all.
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Fig. 3. Demand (D, users’ aggregate marginal utility), supply (S, aggregator’s
marginal cost), average total cost (ATC) and marginal revenue (MR) curves in
the market generated by the SCPA proxy phase. The segment of D between
points A and C constitutes the core of the market.
At this point, the seller’s profit is zero, and any further
reductions in price or increases in production make it unprof-
itable for the seller to partici pate in the market.
We now wish to show some properties of the proxy auction,
that link the rules defining the final allocation and prices to
the bidders’ behaviour, under a mild assumption on their pref-
erences. To begin, we require the following characterisation
of an auction’s outcome.
Next, we argue that the worth function satisfies bidder
submodularity (BSM), which is necessary and sufficient for
subsequent results.
Definition 4: A worth function is bidder submodular if:
w(S)−w(S \T)≥ ∑
i∈T
w(S)−w(S \ i) ∀i ∈ T, ∀T ⊆I .
Intuitively, if w(S) satisfies BSM, an additional bidder is
more valuable when the market is small than when it is
large. The SCPA proxy phase is an auction for a single time–
slot, with prices for substitute and complimentary time–slots
partially determined in the preceding clock phase. Now, resi-
dential users of electricity are known to value the first portion
of their electricity use greatly, as illustrated by an estimated
own-price elasticity for electricity that are very close to zero
(see, e.g. [17], and the survey of results therein). Although
part of this is driven by users’ technological inflexibility, we
argue that bidders’ demand for electricity in a single time–slot
generates a worth function that satisfies BSM, ceteris paribus.1
Theorem 1: Let the coalition worth w(S) satisfy BSM,
and assume that the aggregator computes minimal competitive
equilibrium prices. Then the proxy phase of the SCPA imple-
ments the (VCG) allocation of the auction, and straightforward
bidding by the bidders is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Proof sketch. The proof has three steps, and largely fol-
lows the sequence of arguments put forward in [18] for
ascending price proxy auctions. The main difference in our
1 In combinatorial domains with package bids (bids specified over bundles
of goods), it is quite possible that bidders violate this condition: Imagine
a bidder i with high demand for a particular item that is complementary
to several other bidders’ packages. Including i could drive demand for the
complementary goods down sufficiently far that the worth of any coalition
containing i is below that of those not containing i. However, the proxy phase
of the SCPA is not a combinatorial domain, as only one slot is cleared at a
time so it is difficult to construct an example violating BSM.
setting is that the proxy auction is run implicitly by asking
for a demand schedule, which can be interpreted as a proxy–
bidder for the users, and (numerically) solving for the MCE
prices given an aggregation of the bidders’ demand schedules.
First, we have already argued that the worth function
satisfies a bidder submodularity (BSM) condition, as indicated
by statistical evidence.
Second, call a core outcome bidder optimal for i 6= 0 if it
maximises i’s payoff over all core outcomes. BSM implies
that there is a unique bidder–optimal core outcome, that is
unanimously preferred by all bidders. Moreover, this core
outcome corresponds to the MCE prices and allocations [19],
and these are sufficient to support the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves
(VCG) allocation of the auction ([18], Theorem 7).
Finally, implementing the VCG allocation in this way
brings sincere bidding into Bayes-Nash equilibrium ([18],
Theorem 8). Thus, under a mild condition on the bidders’
utilities and assuming that the aggregator computes minimal
competitive equilibrium prices, straightforward bidding is an
equilibrium action in the proxy auction phase.
B. The Role of the Clock Phase
The clock phase is effectively a non-cooperative coordina-
tion game, in which the bidders negotiate over a price vector
p and a collection of (partially) coordinated demands d to
maximise their own utilities. The fact that the aggregator is in
control of the price adjustments removes the ability for bidders
to engage in the most gratuitous gaming actions, while the RP
constraint further reduces the scope for manipulations. Thus,
increasing the price of those time–slots that have a revenue
deficit sends a clear signal to the users that these slots are
more heavily congested. Specifically, the price discovery done
by the clock phase allows the costs of any inter-temporal com-
plementarities to be largely priced into each agent’s decision.
As such, in the proxy phase, participants’ demand functions
only need to be specified over a relatively small interval, given
that the prices are partially determined for all other time–slots;
effectively, the agents are able to state their marginal utilities
for electricity in the next time–slot ceteris paribus.
C. The Allocation and Price Sequence
In this section we argue that if the clock phases do manage to
coordinate users’ energy use over the decision horizon, then
the sequence of allocations and prices generated by a SCPA is,
in some sense, an efficient one. We leave this as an informal
argument, because the assumption on the efficiency of the
clock phases is very strong.
On-line problems have no true optimality conditions, and
the problem to which we apply the SCPA mechanism is no
different. Given this, we highlight the following quality of the
SCPA. To begin, fix the decision horizon H . Then note that a
one-shot clock–proxy auction, such as the one described in [1],
implements bidder-optimal core allocation (assuming BSM
worth functions). Therefore, if the SCPA were reduced to a
one-shot clock–proxy auction on H , then the same conditions
on the outcome as above would be expected. Next, if the clock
phases do efficiently coordinate users’ energy use over H
8then SCPA’s allocation at time–slot t + 1 is consistent with
the bidder-optimal core allocation over all H . The argument
above can be applied recursively, so the allocation for all time–
slots in H is in the bidder-optimal core. Thus, if the SCPA
was finite and the clock auction fully informative, it would
sequentially implement a bidder-optimal core allocation.
There is one major caveat to this result: The overall ef-
ficiency of the SCPA depends greatly on the clock phase
providing enough information to allow the households to
undertake efficient scheduling of their energy use over the
longer-term. Without that, the efficiency of the proxy phases
are of little merit. Thus, identifying conditions where the clock
phase is sufficiently informative is a particularly important
focus of our future work.
VI. DEMONSTRATION
In this section we demonstrate the SCPA. First, we focus on
the clock phase and show how prices are initially discovered
for the slots in a particular decision horizon. Second, we
show how the proxy phase operates given the prices from
the preceding clock phase. Finally, we evaluate the long-term
performance of the SCPA when it used as a receding-horizon
on–line mechanism. The SCPA is a very general model that
can accommodate any upward sloping supply schedule and a
very general class of utility models — quasi-linear utilities
satisfying BSM.
Before describing the demonstration and presenting the
results, a brief discussion of this section’s significance is
warranted. The revenue deficit and price adjustment rules used
by the aggregator are trivial to implement for any monotonic
cost function. This includes those generated by piece–wise
linear supply function bidding, which is an bid format used
in many wholesale electricity dispatch auctions. Note the
(quadratic) cost and (linear) ATC functions that are used here
are employed for demonstration purposes only, and as such,
are kept simple for clarity and are not intended to represent
the costs of participating in a real energy market. On the other
hand, most of the computation in a SCPA is carried out by
users (or their EMS agents). Thus, assuming that the utility
models descibed below are appropriate for some portion of
electricity users, general insights can be gained regarding the
computation and communication requirements of a SL–DR
scheme employing a SCPA.
A. Scenario Parameters
We assume the aggregator faces a quadratic cost function:2
ch(xh) = a xh
2,
where a captures the thermal generators’ efficiency, and take
values of 0.002. Furthermore, we assume that the aggregator
is benevolent and only aims to only break even, so its supply
function is given by average total cost: ch(xh)/xh = axh.
We model a system comprising 1000 users with flexible
loads, which all posses quasi–linear utilities as in Equation (1),
2 Linear and constant terms are dominated by the quadratic term, so are
ignored for simplicity.
but have three different types of value functions vi. All three
value functions are convex, but they are subject to energy use
constraints of varying complexity, which render the overall
problem non–convex.
Each call for bids is associated with a new set of prices
computed by the aggregator. A user’s response to these new
prices (its bidding strategy) could take many different forms,
including conditioning its bid on previous levels of aggregate
demand or information that it may have inferred about other
bidders’ preferences. However, the analysis provided in Sec-
tion V shows that the bidding and price update rules of the
SCPA remove most of the opportunities for profitable gaming.
As such, we assume that a user employs a straightforward or
truthful bidding strategy.
A user’s straightforward bid is given by the solution to the
following problem for the corresponding price level p:
max
di
vi(di,θi)− p⊤ ·di (9)
s.t. constraints encoded in θi.
Three valuation models giving concrete specifications of
vi(di,θi) are discussed below.
The first model of user’s values for electricity is taken
from [4], which use two-piece quadratic/linear function of total
electricity use over the horizon di = 1⊤ ·di:
vi(di) =
{
ωdi− α2 (d
i)2, if 0 ≤ di < ωi
αi
,
ωi
2
2αi if
ωi
αi
≤ di,
where αi and ωi are idiosyncratic parameters that determine a
household’s value. Specifically, both are generated at random
from a normal distribution, with αi ∼N (0.1,0.022) and ωi ∼
N (0.5,0.022). In addition, energy use variables are subject
to minimum and maximum constraints, which vary between
0 and 4kWh per slot. In this model, θi comprises these con-
straints and the parameters αi and ωi. In this case, Equation (9)
is a convex optimsation problem.
The second model use a logarithmic function of electricity
use in each slot independently:
vi(di) = ∑
h∈H
max
[
αi logdih, 0
]
,
where αi ∼N (3.0,0.1) is an idiosyncratic parameter (specifi-
cally, its mean value; see below), and energy use variables are
subject to the same minimum and maximum constraints as in
the first model. Like the first model, Equation (9) is a convex
optimsation problem, and θi comprises these constraints and
the parameter αi.
The third model is taken from [20] and similar to the one
formulated in [21], in which each household agent faces a cost
minimisation appliance scheduling problem. In this, a house-
hold’s value function is assumed to be constant (and large),
so that it can be ignored in the optimisation problem, which
reduces the optimisation problem in Equation (9) to a linear
program. However, each appliance’s energy use is subject
to different constraint for different device types, making the
problem a mixed integer linear program (MILP). Specifically,
the MILP’s constraints include the minimum/maximum en-
ergy constraints listed above, more complex inter–temporal
9couplings, e.g. to capture devices with minimum up-times,
as well as binary variable constraints to model devices with
discrete operating power points (e.g. dishwashers and washing
machines).3 In this model, θi is wholly comprised by these
constraints.
We also include an amount of uncontrollable load, which
represents both energy users that are not part of the scheduling
system, and demand that has no flexibility in its timing or
magnitude (see the dark area in the lower panel of Fig. 5).
Finally, all five components of this demonstration — the
cost function, three user preference models and uncontrolled
load — are subject to perturbations or noise. Most of these
perturbations are shocks to parameters and constraint values
that are realised at the start of the final clock phase of time slot,
which is at most 30 minutes prior to the slot beginning. As
such, mean values are used to calculate bids and costs during
the first H− 1 rounds of the clock phase for each time–slot.
The specific shocks are described below: The cost function
parameter a is perturbed my a multiplicative shock with log-
normal distribution lnN (0,0.052) (i.e. with a mean of 1).
Similarly, the first and second valuation models have their
upper and lower variable bounds perturbed by a multiplicative
shock lnN (0,1) (the same shock is applied to both upper and
lower bounds), while the second model’s valuation parameter
αi is also perturbed by the same degree. The third valuation
model’s constraints are specified at the device level, and relate
to the timing of use of each device; in contrast to the other
shocks, these “start after” and “end before” constraints are
randomly shifted forward or backward by up to three slots
(1.5 hours) at the beginning of each day, with the shift drawn
from a discrete uniform distribution. The uncontrolled load
is randomly perturbed by a small amount of Gaussian noise
(with a coefficient of variation of 0.5%), which is intended to
emulate unpredictable and uncontrollable loads in the system.
B. Initial Clock Phase Demonstration
The clock phase operates as follows: For slots with a rev-
enue deficit, price increments are computed by first finding the
zero of the line passing through the previous two increments’
revenue deficits; call this p0(k,k−1). This price indicates the
point at which revenue exceeds demand if the kth iteration’s
electricity demand xkh is maintained in iteration k+ 1. Then
δk+1h = min
[
p0(k,k− 1)− pkh, ¯δ
]
is computed, which limits
the price increment to a pre–specified maximum value. Each
pk+1h is then updated by Equation (3). In our test scenario, the
maximum price increment is set to ¯δ = $0.01.
The operation of the clock phase for the first slot is shown
in Fig. 4. Each point plotted is the result of a price/aggregate
demand bid pair for an iteration of the clock phase, starting
from a price of $0.40, with p increasing at each iteration.
The upper panel of Fig. 4 shows that revenue decreases as
the time–slot price increases, as the effect of less electricity
sold is greater than that of the price increase, but it decreases
at a slower rate than total cost. This demonstrates that the
3The appliances’ daily energy consumption are obtained from Ausgrid’s
appliance usage guide, available at: www.ausgrid.com.au.
assumption on the slopes of the total cost and aggregate
utility functions in Section V-A is valid. Since we consider
relatively large numbers of users, total cost and demand
decrease smoothly with increasing price to a closing price
of about $0.4488 in 7 iterations, at which point the proxy
auction for the first phase halted, although prices continued
to rise for other slots until the entire proxy phase closed after
10 iterations. Note that the maximum step size is used until
the price reaches $0.44, at which point the smaller step size
described above is employed to reduce the overshoot of the
price update step. Finally, close observation reveals that the
demand function is increasingly steep, validating our claim of
a BSM worth function in earlier analysis.
Fig. 5 shows the closing prices of the 48 clock auctions run
in the first phase, and their corresponding energy allocations.
What can be most clearly seen from this is the effects of
inflexible demand (the dark part of the columns) on the price.
Those slots with the largest inflexible loads have the highest
prices, and conversely, a large drop in price occurs at 21:00
when the uncontrolled load decreases abruptly, even though
flexible loads move to exploit the lower prices after this time.
C. Proxy Phase Demonstration
The proxy phase was constructed by first, taking the final
two clock phase price points to define the price interval,
then asking for bids for each of five evenly-spaced price
levels across this interval, and using linear interpolation to
to calculate the partial equilibrium. Here, the efficacy of our
price increment rule in limiting the price overshoot is clearly
demonstrated by the small size of the proxy-phase interval.
The proxy phase finds the MCE price to be $0.4483 and
the corresponding predicted demand to be 185.5kWh, with
revenue and total cost equal at $100.47.
D. Day–long Demonstration
The day-long demonstration involves restarting the clock
phase and opening a new clock auction for slot t +H (=49)
after the proxy phase closes. In order to allow users to
adjust their demands in response to random events affecting
their electricity demand, some flexibility is injected into the
restarted clock phase prices, in the form of price restart dis-
counts. These discounts are applied to the previous clock phase
closing prices to determine the opening prices in the new clock
phase, and they are a free parameter of the auction design. In
this demonstration, we choose to set this to a uniform discount
of 25%, but it is our conjecture that these discounts can be
tuned to provide better convergence performance.
Fig. 6 shows the sequence of proxy phase outcomes over
the duration of one day. Price and demand are negatively
correlated, although not exactly, reflecting the users’ prefer-
ences and constraints of the time at which they use electricity.
These are caused by a combination of: (i) the users’ con-
straints on electricity demand (use-time constraints for certain
controllable devices, uncontrollable loads as in Fig. 5, etc.),
and, (ii) users responding to different prices at different times.
Specifically, there is high peak in price during the morning
(6:00-8:30) corresponding to a peak in uncontrolled load,
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followed by a series of slightly lower peak in flexible use
through the middle of the day associated with price spikes.
In the evening (16:00-20:30) higher uncontrollable load levels
again drive up the price, but flexible loads are able to move
into late time–slots to avoid the consequent higher prices (i.e.
after 21:00). This demonstrates how the SCPA balances the
dynamics of users’ willingness to pay for electricity at certain
times of the day with the cost of supply, by allowing loads to
be adapted to conditions in a flexible, on–line manner.
Finally, we compare the outcome of the SCPA to that of
a fixed time–of–use (ToU) tariff. The prices used in the ToU
tariff are chosen heuristically to moderate the electricity use
customers, subject to the constraint that all costs are recovered
over the day (although in practice this condition is applied
over a duration of months or even a year). In addition, only a
few different prices are used, as is commonplace with existing
retail ToU tariffs; in this case three price levels are employed,
with values of (0.445,0.460,0.468) for time–slots 22:00-6:00,
06:00-16:30 and 20:00-22:00, and 16:30-20:00, respectively.
Fig. 7 shows the load profile and revenue deficits induced by
this tariff. Although the load is largely levelised across the day,
at certain times it fails to reflect the actual costs of supplying
electricity. In particular, the spike in load between 5:00-6:00
drives the price of generation far above the ToU tariff price
for that time, resulting in a large revenue deficit. More longer
imbalances between price/revenue and generation cost are seen
through the middle of the day, where cost exceed revenue,
and in the evening, when revenue exceed revenue. Indeed,
because the exact timing and magnitude of these imbalances
is effectively a random variable, such a spike in load would be
seen under any fixed electricity tariff. In contrast, the SCPA
provides a mechanism for providing energy users with timely
price information that reflects actual electricity supply costs,
demand levels, and system conditions.
E. Computational requirements
The demonstration above was computed using MATLAB R©
on an Intel R© i7-2600 8 core CPU (3.40GHz) with 16GB of
memory, with the agent optimisation routines run in parallel.
With this setup, one day’s allocation was simulated in about
97 minutes. It took an average of 11.6 iterations per clock
phase, and with 5 price levels in each proxy phase, this results
in ≈7.3s per iteration, or an average of 0.058s per agent
(the aggregator’s computation is trivial). Given that a real
deployment of the SCPA would run each agent optimisation
routine completely in parallel, these computation times make
an iterative auction format for on–line scheduling, at half-
hourly or shorter intervals, entirely feasible.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper develops a two-phase iterative auction mechanism
for allocating a divisible and continually produced good (elec-
tricity) over time and on–line, to users that have preferences
specified over demand levels in combinations of time–slots.
This mechanism is for use by an aggregator of small-load
demand–response resources, and in this context, its design
addresses three key challenges of combinatorial preferences,
private information and scalability.
The main aim of our future work is to integrate the
SCPA technique into a load-side control system comprising a
sophisticated home energy management unit alongside control
and optimisation routines for different time-scales.
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